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The Forgotten Competitive Arena: Strategy in Natural Resource Industries
Abstract
Despite their importance in the global economy, the complex competitive dynamics of natural 
resource industries and their implications for business performance remain largely 
understudied in strategic management. This article identifies major traits that are highly 
relevant in natural resource industries, including the standardized nature of their products, 
their emphasis on process-based innovations, the presence of dual physical and financial 
derivative markets, and the importance of non-market forces that affect the creation and 
appropriation of rents from natural resources. We propose a general framework that guides 
our observations and, and we discuss research opportunities for the study of firm strategy in 
natural resource industries. 
Keywords: natural resource industries, commodities, competitive dynamics, non-market 
strategy






























































Natural resource industries are undoubtedly among the most important sectors of the 
world economy. Worldwide, at least 800 million people—about 25 percent of the total global 
workforce—work in agriculture or mining (Timmer, de Vries & de Vries, 2015), producing 
commodities that account for one quarter of global trade (UNCTAD, 2015). In many cases, 
the export shares of commodities produced by natural resource industries have grown faster 
than those of typical manufactured products, such as pharmaceuticals and computers (World 
Trade Organization, 2010). Firms in natural resource industries are relevant market players 
(one in ten firms in Forbes’ ranking of the largest public companies operates in mining, 
upstream oil, or forestry) and are also active non-market actors, topping the list for political 
campaign contributions.1 Finally, several developed and emerging economies are highly 
dependent on natural resource sectors (Venables, 2016). The historical development of 
Australia, Canada, Norway, and, to a large extent, even the United States originates from 
productivity gains in agriculture, mining, and oil. Today, countries like Azerbaijan, Brazil, 
Chile, and many African nations rely on natural resources to finance their (cyclical) growth 
and development programs (Deaton, 1999). 
The importance of these industries notwithstanding, strategic management research 
has paid little, if any, attention to the particularities of natural resource industries and the 
challenges to survival and growth that they face (George, Schillebeeckx, & Liak, 2015; 
Shapiro, Hobdabi, & Oh, 2018). Although natural resources have long been examined 
through the lens of sustainability and environmental management (Hart, 1995; Sharma & 
Vredenburg, 1998), these industries’ competitive dynamics and the resulting firm-level 
performance implications remain largely understudied. This is both unexpected and difficult 
to explain. We argue that a more focused research emphasis on natural resource industries 
1 See Center for Responsive Politics: 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=c&showYear=2017






























































would not only enhance the ability of strategy research to inform critical current debates, but 
also uncover novel and understudied issues that represent unique opportunities for theory 
refinement and development. Our objective is therefore to stimulate scholarly debate around 
issues faced by firms competing in natural resource sectors, capitalizing on their distinctive 
traits and eliciting critical implications for their competitive dynamics as well as their market 
and non-market strategies. 
Our paper seeks to draw attention to the fact that, far from being ‘mature’ or ‘stable’ 
sectors, natural resource industries are fundamentally dynamic, exhibiting high turnover rates 
and substantial variation in within-sector competitive patterns across countries.2 We submit 
that a more detailed examination of these patterns can greatly inform potential new avenues of 
strategy research. At a more conceptual level, we ground our discussion in research that 
examines industry evolution as a process of resource accumulation and change (Cimoli, Dosi, 
Nelson, & Stiglitz, 2009; Lazzarini, 2015; Teece, Pisano, & Shen, 1997). Our contribution is 
to outline six general observations about relevant and often neglected features of natural 
resource industries influencing processes of value creation and appropriation, and then derive 
implications for future advances in strategy research. 
Specifically, we observe that natural resource commodities are inherently standardized 
products that do not necessarily fit product lifecycle theories and, relatedly, that commodity-
producing natural resource industries are not subject to frequent waves of radical product 
innovation but rather to process innovations. We also show that, unlike products in other 
sectors, natural resource commodities trade in both financial and physical markets, with 
2 We are aware of very few studies using good comprehensive data that allow for inter-industry comparisons of 
firm dynamics (e.g., Bartelsman et al., 2009; Buddelmeyer et al., 2006). However, such comparisons remain 
inherently difficult due to the scarcity of comprehensive, multi-sector, selection bias-free, micro-level panel data. 
Lack of data, however, should not obscure the relevance of strategic decision-making and the consequent firm 
dynamics in less studied industries.






























































important implications for how firms develop competitive advantages in these multiple 
competitive arenas. In our view, these observations convey patterns of firm-level resource 
accumulation and change that are particularly relevant in natural resource industries. We also 
observe that in commodity sectors based on natural resources, cooperative rent-preserving 
mechanisms tend to be prevalent, largely defying competition policy, and that stakeholder 
engagement has a large influence on the appropriation of rents. Finally, we note that natural 
resource sectors are deeply intertwined with industrial development policies that can affect 
processes of both value creation and capture. Our view is that these last three observations 
relate to critical non-market forces that are highly prevalent in natural resource industries.
Building on these observations, we then discuss research implications for the study of 
firm strategy in natural resource industries. Our goal is to provide a systematic analysis of the 
theoretical challenges and research opportunities in the forgotten competitive arena of natural 
resource industries, and stimulate novel research advancing our understanding of industry and 
firm competitive behavior under the set of conditions that are uniquely present in those 
industries. All six observations above bring opportunities for both theoretical and empirical 
research. From a theoretical standpoint, we outline potential research avenues that, at their 
core, concern how firms in natural resource industries dynamically develop new or reinforced 
heterogeneous resources aimed at either value creation or capture. From an empirical 
standpoint, we delineate how singular features of natural resource industries can serve to 
empirically uncover the existence of otherwise hard to observe firm resources.
The rest of our paper consists of four sections. First, we document our methodical 
review of the relevant literature and explicitly provide evidence of the lack of strategy 
research focused on natural resource industries. Next, we elaborate our observations on the 
fundamental characteristics of natural resource industries as they pertain to strategy research. 






























































We build on these observations to propose paths for future research. The last section 
concludes.
Research on Natural Resource Industries
Research on strategic management in natural resource industries is scarce. To the best 
of our knowledge, George et al. (2015) was the first study to point out this void in the 
strategic management literature. Their review of publications in the Academy of Management 
Journal (AMJ) since its inception exposes a striking lack of attention to natural resource 
industries and firms operating in these markets. Their analysis reveals that the strategic 
management literature has confined the notion of resources to individual, organizational, and 
inter-organizational assets—as inspired by resource-based theory—and that, when mentioned, 
natural resources are rarely the focal aspect of a study, but rather seen as incidental to the 
management theory being addressed.3 Shapiro et al. (2018) confirm George et al.’s (2015) 
findings. Their review of original research published in four leading international business 
journals reveals that fewer than one percent of articles are focused on extractive and natural 
resource sectors. 
Our own review of the literature expands George et al.’s (2015) analysis to four other 
leading management journals: Administrative Science Quarterly, Management Science, 
Organization Science, and Strategic Management Journal. We reviewed all issues published 
between 2006 and 2017. We first specified a definition for natural resource industries, taking 
as a starting point goods classified as natural resources in the United Nations System of 
3 These authors detect an almost complete absence of articles addressing the particularities of natural resource 
industries. Of the 3,456 AMJ articles published between 1963 and 2015, they find only 319 that have the term 
‘resource’ in the title, abstract, author-supplied keywords, or subject terms. Of those 319 articles, only one 
specifies ‘natural resources’ as a keyword. 






























































National Accounts.4 According to this convention, natural resource commodities build on 
non-manufactured, naturally occurring assets (i.e., assets not created by an artificial 
production process). These consist of uncultivated forests and fish stocks, land, and mineral 
deposits. Natural resource commodities may be extracted and sold with minor processing, but 
they may also undergo more extensive secondary or downstream processing. While it is not 
always straightforward to draw the line between extractive and manufactured products made 
from natural resource inputs, natural resource commodities that undergo secondary processing 
may still be considered natural resources (IMF, 2017). Thus, our focus comprises firms 
involved in activities sorted under Division Structures A (agriculture, forestry, fishing) and B 
(mining and quarrying) in the International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC).5 
Consistent with this categorization, natural resource industries share a common characteristic: 
they explore, develop or extract a host of natural resources (such as land for agricultural 
products or mineral reserves for metals) and, even if there is some transformation process 
involved, the natural resource represents a relevant portion of costs or physical extraction 
processes, and the resulting product remains a standardized asset traded in more or less 
fungible markets.6 This last feature justifies the common usage of the term ‘natural resource 
4 International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), Revision 4, 2008. The database is freely available for 
download through the World Bank trade website (www.worldbank.org\trade) under the Data & Statistics 
section.
5 These ISIC codes include agricultural production crops (01), agriculture production, livestock, and animal 
specialties (02), agriculture services (07), forestry (08), fishing, hunting, and trapping (09), metal mining (10), 
coal mining (12), oil and gas extraction (13) and mining and quarrying of nonmetallic minerals (14).
6 Note that the products defined above trade on well-defined commodity exchanges such as the London Metal 
Exchange (LME) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Participants in the LME can trade up to 14 non-
ferrous (aluminum, copper, zinc, nickel, lead, tin), ferrous (steel scrap and steel rebar), minor (cobalt and 
molybdenum), and precious metals (gold, silver, palladium, platinum). The CME trades agriculture, energy, and 
metal commodities. Agriculture commodities include dairy, livestock, grains and oilseeds, lumber and pulp, and 






























































commodities’ to describe products directly originated from natural resources, which is 
conceptually different from the case of manufactured products that become commoditized 
over time. 
Our search procedure began with the identification of keywords and terms that would 
most typically denote academic research in natural resources. We determined these terms 
using George et al.’s (2015) query string and the identification of the commodity-producing 
industries depicted above. We then combined the identified terms and keywords into a search 
string that we operationalized in the Scopus database by restricting our query to papers in the 
five chosen journals that contain any of the string terms in their titles, abstracts, or author-
supplied keywords.7 The operationalization of the string yielded 138 articles.8
We then examined the resulting papers in a three-stage process. Firstly, we carefully 
scrutinized the titles, keywords, and abstracts of all 138 articles in order to understand each 
one’s treatment of natural resources and identify those that were actually about natural 
resource industries. Of this initial list, only 68 manuscripts related directly to natural resource 
softs (such as coffee, cotton, and cocoa). The energy commodities are biofuels, coal, crude oil, natural gas, and 
petrochemicals, while the traded metals are mostly the same as those traded on the LME.
7 The resulting search string is as follows: "natural resources*" OR wind OR oil OR gas OR solar OR steel OR 
forest OR diamond* OR gold OR silver OR coal OR ferrous OR aluminium OR copper OR dairy OR livestock 
OR grains OR oilseeds OR lumber OR pulp OR coffee OR cotton OR cocoa OR biofuels OR “natural gas” OR 
petroleum OR petrochemicals OR metal OR land OR agriculture* OR commodit* OR energy* OR renewable 
OR "natural environment". 
8 We first ran George et al.’s (2015) query string but noted that the search yielded several papers unrelated to 
natural resources due to the alternative meanings of the search terms “nature OR input OR material OR 
throughput OR water OR food”. Therefore, we deleted those terms from our string and added several others 
based on our definition of natural resource industries: for example, George et al.’s (2015) string omits the search 
term ‘gold’ and thus does not capture Henisz et al.’s (2014) paper, but ours does.






























































industries.9 Secondly, we agreed on a set of criteria to assess to what extent each paper’s 
contribution is rooted in the particularities of commodities and natural resource industries. 
Based on these criteria, each of us screened every paper and judged whether it advances 
strategic management research. We found that most studies simply use natural resource 
industries as an empirical context, with no interest in drawing particular implications for firm 
behavior and/or outcome heterogeneity in those industries. Overall, we identified only eleven 
articles that seem to address, either theoretically or empirically, novel issues that specifically 
pertain to natural resource industries.
Our final list includes six papers on operations management (Boyabatlı, 2015; Chen, 
Tomlin, & Wang, 2013; Dong, Kouvelis, & Wu, 2014; Goel & Gutierrez, 2011; Nadarajah, 
Margot, & Secomandi, 2015; Wu & Chen, 2010). None of these papers mentions the term 
‘strategy’; rather, they essentially focus on production optimization criteria and process 
design when strategic decisions have already been made (e.g., production capacity or product 
choice). One exception is Chen et al. (2013), who analyze product line design and process 
innovation in the case of products that can have multiple types of quality classification or 
grade.
In our review, we also identified two manuscripts addressing price volatility in natural 
resource industries (Popescu and Seshadri; 2013; Singleton, 2013). Both manuscripts point 
towards the fact that the existence of multiple markets increases the need for superior price 
monitoring and contracting capabilities. Weigelt and Shittu (2016) rely on the renewable 
industry to show that resource redeployment is not simply the outcome of internal firm 
decisions but a response to external regulatory mandates. Finally, Henisz, Dorobantu, and 
9 The search yielded several papers that use query terms in ways unrelated to natural resources. In several cases, 
the term ‘commodity’ is used to refer to a non-differentiated product with no connection to natural resources. In 
other cases, terms are used as metaphors. 






























































Nartey (2014) provide evidence that stakeholder engagement pays off by showing how 
investments in political and social capital in gold mining reduce opportunistic hold-ups by 
stakeholders with whom firms have no explicit buyer or supplier contracts but whose 
cooperation is nevertheless required to create and capture value. In a related study, they 
examine when and how social and political stakeholders mobilize against mining firms, and 
the impact of such mobilization on the firms’ value (Dorobantu, Henisz, & Nartey, 2017). 
Overall, our review reinforces George et al.’s (2015) initial findings. 
Strategy in Natural Resource Industries: Relevant Market and Non-Market Forces
Why has the strategy literature overlooked the phenomenon and mechanisms 
explaining firm strategy in natural resource industries? One possibility is that management 
scholars implicitly or explicitly assume that natural resource industries lack economic 
relevance or sufficient competitive dynamism to deserve any focused research effort. 
However, we observe that, far from being ‘mature’ or ‘stable’ sectors, natural resource 
industries exhibit high rates of entry and exit and competitive patterns that are not necessarily 
different from what we observe in other industries (Bartelsman et al., 2009; Buddelmeyer et 
al., 2006). Yet, a set of idiosyncratic features that are singular to natural resources makes us 
conclude that we are looking at a unique and fertile research area for strategy research. We 
submit that a more focused examination of those industries could help identify the boundary 
conditions of existing theories and pursue novel advances.
To develop our argument, we consider that industry evolution typically involves a 
process of resource accumulation and change, subject to external shocks that alter the value of 
firms’ resources and their relative positions in the industry (Cimoli et al., 2009; Teece et al., 
1997). Departing from this general idea, we adopt a general framework, depicted in Figure 1, 
characterizing the evolution of natural resource industries as a process involving distinct paths 
of resource accumulation and change subject to market and technological uncertainty, as well 






























































as to institutional factors influencing the ability of firms to capture economic value (see, for 
example, Lazzarini, 2015). This general framework is not intended to explain uniquely how 
natural resource industries behave, as other sectors are equally subject to those processes of 
resource accumulation and change; rather, we use this framework to explain more didactically 
our underlying resource-based mechanisms and then outline specific dynamics whose more 
detailed examination can push the boundaries of existing strategy research. 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***
 Our starting point is that firms in natural resource industries have various forms of 
resources at multiple levels of aggregation. Thus, departing from an existing resource 
endowment, firms can reinforce their existing specialization (paths 1 and 2). This might 
occur, for instance, when an agriculture-intensive country further expands its production and 
marketing capabilities. This process, however, is subject to resource depletion (path 3), given 
the non-renewable nature of some natural resources or the possibility that renewable natural 
resources may be exploited at an unsustainable rate. Alternatively, firms can pursue new 
development by building on natural resources (path 4). For instance, agricultural commodities 
might stimulate investment in other industrialized products with derived demand (such as 
dairy products, ethanol, or farm machinery), or an agricultural firm may transform itself into a 
financial trader with new, distinct market capabilities. 
These (heterogeneous) paths are affected by important market and technological 
shocks that drastically change the value of natural resources and affect firms’ incentives to 
pursue reinforced specialization or new specialization paths building from those natural 
resources. They are also influenced by the industrial policies in place, which essentially alter 
the incentives of agents to pursue particular paths of resource accumulation and change 
(Lazzarini, 2015). These policies can be general (country-level) or sector-specific (industry-
level); for instance, a given country may set general standards to deal with resource depletion 






























































or implement regulations and subsidies to promote alternative, sustainable technological 
processes. As a response to those regulations, firms may also geographically diversify their 
sourcing of natural resources, with operations that span distinct regions and even countries.
In addition, strategy scholars have forcefully argued that the existence of valuable 
resources does not necessarily translate into superior industry- or firm-level economic 
performance, as stakeholders may have distinct bargaining power to negotiate and influence 
the distribution of rents (e.g., Coff, 1999; Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015). As we explain 
below, arrangements affecting rent appropriation can occur at the industry level (e.g., firms 
colluding to attenuate their rivalry and coordinate joint production) or network level (e.g., 
firms forming associations to manage mutual interdependencies and deal with multiple 
stakeholders). These rent-preserving arrangements can also influence the very process of 
policymaking (e.g., trade associations may lobby for particularly industry-specific policies), 
thereby leading to a bidirectional relationship between industrial policy and natural resources: 
while policies can affect processes of resource accumulation and change, the outcome of 
those processes can also influence policymaking through the political action of associations 
and various forms of stakeholder relations. 
Using this general framework, the rest of this section presents our view on the 
idiosyncrasies of natural resource industries in the form of six general observations, which 
explain fundamental market and non-market forces influencing industry-, network-, and firm-
level strategies in those sectors.
Observation #1: The evolution of natural resource commodities is likely to follow 
different pathways than those described in product lifecycle theories
The propositions of product lifecycle theories, which have been developed in a context 
of product differentiation, encounter substantial challenges when applied to natural resource 
commodities. At its core, the product lifecycle of differentiated products (Klepper, 1997) 






























































starts with a radical innovation that then triggers an imitation process—“an endogenous and 
dynamic two-way relationship between the variety (the range introduced) and selection (the 
relative importance of competing alternatives) of innovations” (Agarwal et al., 2002, p. 972). 
Initially, many firms enter the market, producing different variants of the product or service, 
and competition focuses on product innovation (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). Such 
innovations widen the competitive landscape as new entrants enlarge the industry base until 
technological and consumer uncertainties vanish and industry output takes off (Echambadi, 
Bayus, & Agarwal, 2008). A bigger market attracts new entrants, increased rivalry pushes 
prices downward (Klepper & Graddy, 1990), and firms refocus on cost efficiency. 
Subsequently, selection pressures emerge and determine both minimum scale survival 
thresholds (Muller, 1997) and competitive isolating mechanisms. This process finally results 
in the emergence of niche competitors and the exit of some firms (Agarwal et al., 2002; 
Klepper & Graddy, 1990).
However, firms that compete in natural resource industries generally produce and 
trade commodities,10 which are assets whose economic value is based on highly standardized 
intrinsic characteristics that are usually independent of the producer. Commodities like 
soybeans or oil are totally or partially fungible, meaning that the market will trade them as 
long as they meet a specified minimum standard known as basis grade. For example, the 
market offers a spot price for all soybeans with a certain amount of protein, without reference 
to the farmer that produced them; similarly, the spot price for an ounce of 14k gold does not 
depend on the mining company that extracted it. Therefore, opportunities for product 
innovation are limited and prices tend to follow cyclical trends dictated by a complex 
10 There are some exceptions, however. For instance, in the case of rare earths, markets are less liquid and 
transactions are more dependent on specific negotiations. However, for the large majority of natural resource 
industries, our assessments apply..






























































interplay of market and technological shocks. We argue that these features pose substantial 
challenges to the direct application of product lifecycle theories, which have been largely 
developed in a context of product differentiation. 
It is true that, as indicated by path 4 in Figure 1, natural resource commodities can 
generate new forms of resource accumulation based on derived demand that occurs 
downstream (e.g., industrialized agricultural production) or somewhat inelastic supply 
upstream (e.g., mining equipment). For instance, McDermott, Corredoira, and Kruse (2009) 
describe a process of technological upgrading from agricultural to premium wine production 
in Argentina. However, these related industries display competitive dynamics that are 
fundamentally different from those of the natural resources that triggered the new resource 
accumulation in the first place. It is also true that, in some cases, commodity producers have 
tried to differentiate their products by emphasizing environmentally friendly processes, 
regional origin, or socially responsible practices (e.g., fair trade products), but the impact of 
these efforts has proved modest (see Delmas, Russo, & Montes-Sancho, 2007). Thus, 
resource accumulation within natural resource industries tends to follow paths 1 and 2: over 
time, firms specialize their tangible assets and intangible capabilities to deliver standardized 
products that rarely change. 
This restricted scope for product differentiation poses challenges for the direct 
application of extant product lifecycle theories. In natural resources, innovations are largely 
based on processes (see Observation #2 below) rather than on product attributes—gas, iron, 
and wheat, for instance, have existed for centuries with their key attributes virtually 
unchanged. If the intrinsic features of a commodity are largely invariant, except perhaps for 
infra-marginal changes in grade, then we might expect particular competitive implications 
that, to some extent, should differ from those of differentiated products. Hence, we believe 






























































that existing product lifecycle theories would at best be incomplete in explaining dynamics in 
natural resource industries.
Along these lines, the long-term decline in prices for most manufactured products, which 
is a fundamental evolutionary pattern for differentiated product industries subject to increasing 
entry and imitation, does not necessarily hold for natural resource industries. Instead, the prices 
of natural resources oscillate in shorter cycles and longer waves or ‘supercycles’ (Erten & 
Ocampo, 2012; Jacks, 2013), during which prices tend to exhibit high volatility (World Trade 
Report, 2010). Figure 2, for instance, compares the evolution of the inflation-adjusted US 
Producer Price Index for wood pulp to the US Consumer Price Index for new cars. The former 
series is much more volatile, featuring cycles that indicate unique and complex market dynamics. 
Figures 3A and 3B, in turn, compare a group of commodities to other manufactured goods. In 
contrast to manufactured goods, prices have actually escalated in some commodity markets 
over time. 
The explanation for this trend involves a combination of supply and demand factors 
that change over time. For instance, the accelerated economic growth of China and other 
emerging markets during the first decade of the twenty-first century increased the demand for 
commodities, whose supply is relatively inelastic, subject to unpredictable climate shocks, 
and affected by technological developments that help increase productivity. These myriad 
shocks most probably affect firm-level decisions to focus their resources on commodity 
production, even if the nature and attributes of their products remain unchanged. In short, 
natural resource sectors call for a much more refined theorizing of the aggregate and firm-
level forces that influence resource accumulation, beyond what is predicted by traditional 
product lifecycle theories. 
*** Insert Figures 2, 3A, and 3B about here***






























































Observation #2: Natural resource industries are not subject to frequent waves of radical 
innovation, but rather to process innovation
Since the intrinsic properties of commodity products hardly change, innovations in 
natural resource industries are mostly driven by changes in production processes. That is, the 
industry lifecycle sequence of product innovations followed by process innovations does not 
hold in these industries; instead, innovations mainly relate to production and organizational 
processes (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1994). These gains further increase productivity, reducing 
cost and improving performance at a decreasing rate. When innovations are mostly process-
based and aimed at increasing the productivity of existing resources, they tend to support 
reinforced specialization (paths 1 and 2 in Figure 1): over time, commodity producers become 
more productive, thus incentivizing more firm-specific investment to exploit their increased 
competitive advantage. In addition, the lower incidence of waves of radical product 
innovation limits the emergence of new competitors with new business models or distinctive 
capabilities. 11
We generally observe that most industry innovations originate from firms that directly 
compete in a particular market. However, although natural resource producers often pursue 
continuous process improvements, a significant amount of process innovation also emanates 
from suppliers.12 For example, increased productivity in agriculture resulted from 
technological improvements in the farm sector (such as no-till farming), but also benefitted 
from innovation waves pursued by producers of farm inputs. Monsanto, for example, 
triggered important improvements in farming through biotechnology (i.e., chemical-resistant 
11 It is worth noting that, since process innovation increases production potential, it may have an adverse impact 
on the market, since the additional supply may alter the existing supply-demand equilibrium, pushing prices 
downward. In fact, it could happen that in the short term, this effect might be similar to that observed in other 
industries, during the development and mature stage of the industry life cycle (Klepper, 1997).
12 Relatedly, Pavitt (1984) shows that in capital intensive industries, innovation is mostly generated by providers.






























































soybeans), which represents a technological change emanating from an upstream sector 
influencing the process of resource accumulation in the core, focal natural resource industry 
(agricultural production). It is also possible that these innovations may result from close 
interactions with users, which should also encourage and promote subsequent refinements 
(Oliveira & von Hippel, 2011). These forces affect the process of technology diffusion and 
adoption in those industries. 
The fact that process innovation in natural resource industries is in several cases not 
only endogenous but also exogenous (e.g., coming from distinct related sectors) implies that 
copying what others are doing is simpler: the best available technologies will spread faster 
than in industries in which at least some reverse engineering of competitor inventions is 
required. When technology diffusion is faster, achieving first mover advantage through 
process innovation becomes more difficult, or the size of the advantage remains smaller. 
Since innovations are potentially exogenous to downstream industry dynamics, supplier-
triggered process innovations in commodity industries generate important movements in 
downstream competition, increasing productivity and altering the mechanisms of value 
creation and value appropriation. 
Observation #3: The volume of commodity exchange-traded financial derivatives is 
much larger than physical production
Natural resource commodities are more or less fungible assets that can be traded in 
both physical and financial markets. Consequently, a large number of commodity exchanges 
around the world trade different commodities and commodity-derived financial contracts (e.g., 
futures and options contracts) at a market-arbitrated price, regardless of the identity of the 
producers. For example, forest products such as lumber and pulp, as well as agricultural products 
such as wheat, corn, soybeans, oats, and livestock, trade on the Chicago Board of Trade (CME), 
while ferrous metals like aluminum, copper, and gold are traded on the London Metal Exchange 






























































(LME). In practice, this fact implies that a typical commodity trades several times in ‘parallel’ 
markets before reaching the physical market. Different sources report that the volume of 
commodities traded under financial contracts is much larger than their physical production, and 
that this ratio has grown substantially during the twenty-first century (Domanski & Heath, 2007; 
Silvennoinen & Thorp, 2013; UNCTAD, 2012). For gold, copper, and aluminum, the volume of 
exchange-traded derivatives was around 30 times larger than their physical production in 2005. 
Moreover, the emergence of these derivative markets has resulted in increased market 
volatility (Duffie & Jackson, 1989; Silvennoinen & Thorp, 2013). Financial investors, who 
accounted for less than 25 percent of all commodity market participants in the 1990s, represented 
more than 85 percent of participants in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2012). Because there are many more 
financial investors, the value of price hedging and speculation strategies now tends to increase 
when demand and supply conditions are highly uncertain. The increase of commodity-backed 
financial markets results from two relevant attributes of natural resource industries, discussed 
before: the tendency toward reinforced specialization (creating large markets of undifferentiated 
products) and the presence of recurring industry shocks, which creates derived demand for 
financial mechanisms to deal with and profit from market uncertainty. In addition, in contrast to 
most markets where consumer preferences reveal that the current value of goods exceeds their 
future value (e.g., manufactured goods subject to competing and improved innovations launched 
over time),13 firms in commodity markets must critically examine demand and supply forces that 
may create upward price trends. 
These complex features require distinct capabilities for firms to compete in each arena. 
For instance, some firms can develop a competitive advantage in the physical market for 
soybeans (e.g., competencies in origination and logistics), as in path 1 in Figure 1, whereas 
other firms can develop new specialized resources and capabilities to operate in financial 
13 Vaccines and art might be exemptions. 






























































markets anchored on commodities (e.g., in arbitrage pricing and hedging), as in path 4 in 
Figure 1. Moreover, some firms may vertically integrate both activities and even dynamically 
diversify their portfolio of capabilities. For example, Bunge Born, a multinational, was 
originally conceived as a grain producer but later exited production and became an important 
financial trader in commodities. In other words, the path of reinforced specialization may 
involve improved capabilities not only in physical commodity markets but also in complex 
financial markets anchored on commodities.
Observation #4: In commodity sectors based on natural resources, cooperative rent-
preserving mechanisms tend to prevail
Conventional wisdom states that commodity prices are purely speculative and highly 
unpredictable, and that structural features in supply and demand make commodities the 
textbook example of perfectly competitive markets. Yet a closer look at the supply side and 
the institutional features of commodity markets—both national and international—reveals 
that oligopolistic forces are fully at play and that producers of natural resources capture value 
through cooperative rent-preserving arrangements. Hence, alternative forms of (explicit or 
tacit) collusion are phenomena that, perhaps paradoxically, can be more prevalent in 
commodity sectors due to the standardized nature of the product (which facilitates the 
creation of common market signals) and the high concentration in commodity sectors subject 
to substantial economies of scale (Motta, 2003). Even when production is more atomized, 
large organizations responsible for the commercialization of commodities may help enforce 
price and quantity coordination (e.g., Ghemawat & Lenk, 1990; The Economist, 2010). 
Cooperation can also arise as a mechanism for countervailing supplier and customer power, 
given the high concentration in sectors with upstream or downstream linkages to natural 
resource industries. In other words, competitors in natural resource industries likely exhibit a 






























































coopetition pattern whereby they compete but at the same time create multiple non-market 
cooperative arrangements to preserve rents (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2006; Lavie, 2007).
For instance, while domestic producers at the sub-national level are most frequently 
numerous and undifferentiated, exporting institutions and international agreements often 
create a virtual global oligopoly of several nations (OPEC is an archetypal example).14 
Empirical evidence documents explicit or tacit collusion arrangements in cocoa, coffee, 
rubber, sugar, and tin (Genesove & Mullin, 1998; Gilbert, 1996; Igami, 2015); basic metals 
such as aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc (Slade & Thille, 2006); and scarce 
mining products such as diamonds, gold, silver, and uranium (Spar, 1994). While these cases 
of collusion often occur at the industry level, cooperation may also occur at the network 
level—that is, firms may form voluntary groups or associations to manage their joint 
production and marketing efforts. Thus, arrangements such as cooperatives, federations, and 
associations tend to implement alternative forms of output restriction practice to ensure 
returns and price stability: see Bolotova (2016) for evidence on US dairy and potato markets 
and Steen and Salvanes (1999) on the Norwegian salmon industry. 
Observation #5: In commodity markets associated with geographically specific natural 
resources, stakeholder engagement has a large influence on the appropriation of rents 
The exploitation of natural resources also creates unique challenges in terms of 
managing stakeholder relations and interacting with multiple public and private actors directly 
or indirectly affected by firm-level strategies (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Baron, 
2001; Shaffer, 1995). Unlike other production processes that do not heavily rely on land, 
water, or mineral reserves as key inputs, firms in commodity industries must demonstrate that 
14 In this case, explicit (as opposed to tacit) collusion may be particularly relevant, especially when many 
producers are involved—i.e., price and quantity coordination may require the presence of a formal agency 
representing the interests of multiple actors.






























































they are not overexploiting natural resources and that the rents generated from their activities 
are benefiting, or at least not harming, relevant stakeholders. Physically extracted natural 
resources may also be closely linked with community-level history, territory, wealth, and the 
anthropological value of land (Hale, 2006). Research on stakeholder identification and 
salience suggests that the exploitation of these local resource endowments may be perceived 
as illegitimate (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), especially when these activities are run by 
firms that do not share the social identity of those local groups, as is often the case with 
foreign entrants (Jensen, 1994). It is no surprise, then, that the particular features of natural 
resource markets force firms to face challenges from activists in the domain of private politics 
(Henisz et al., 2014). In some cases, rents from natural resources may fund and even trigger 
armed conflict (Le Billon, 2001). Essentially, the influence of multiple stakeholders 
constrains firms’ ability to appropriate value from natural resources, making the management 
of complex stakeholder networks essential to increasing the legitimacy of local operations 
(Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). 
At the same time, perceived market power and potential negative externalities in 
natural resource industries trigger the revision of international trade agreements, the passing 
of domestic laws and regulations, and the involvement of competition authorities. In other 
words, stakeholder relations may also affect the bargaining power of industry actors and 
change their ability to appropriate value from their existing resources (Coff, 1999). In 
addition, stakeholder relations can influence the design of industrial policies. It is well 
established that interest groups can impact individual political decision-makers and policy 
outcomes (De Gorter & Swinnen, 2002); and political decision-makers, for their part, can 
shape commodity-related public policies to fulfill their personal goals or ideologies 
(Bellemare & Carnes, 2015; Klomp & de Hann, 2013; Park & Jensen, 2007). All these types 
of stakeholder relations can help industry actors manage the risks inherent in the exploitation 






























































of natural resources. Although the environmental and sustainability implications of natural 
resources have been extensively studied, we still know relatively little about the complex 
interactions that emerge as multiple stakeholders try to appropriate positive value or avoid 
negative impacts from natural resource industries. 
Observation #6: Commodity sectors based on natural resources tend to have a large 
influence on industrial development policies
Our sixth and final observation concerns the role of government policymaking: that is, 
we examine the importance of industrial development policies, defined as government 
interventions aimed at promoting paths of resource accumulation that would normally occur 
in free markets (Cimoli et al., 2009; Lazzarini, 2015). As mentioned before and explained in 
Figure 1, commodity sectors based on natural resources tend to be heavily intertwined with 
industrial development policies. Consider first how policy can affect resource accumulation 
and change. In the context of natural resources, this effect is exemplified in the debate of the 
so-called ‘resource curse’. Resource-rich developing countries tend to grow by exporting 
basic commodities, drawing heavily on natural resources rather than on more ‘advanced’ 
differentiated, technology-intensive products. This process arguably causes overspecialization 
in tradable commodities and may induce negative spillovers into other sectors. For instance, 
exporting natural resource commodities strengthens a country’s currency and makes 
industrialized products less competitive in global markets (for a review, see Frankel, 2010). In 
this setting, some argue that policymakers should deliberately try to incentivize alternative 
paths of resource accumulation and act as a countervailing force against the natural tendency 
of resource-rich countries to specialize in commodities (e.g., Amsden, 2001).
On the other hand, recent work has shown that, under some conditions, the resource 
curse can become a resource blessing: productivity gains in commodity sectors can release 
resources (such as labor and financial resources) to fuel the development of other sectors (see, 






























































for example, Bustos, Caprettini, & Ponticelli, 2016). In addition, as mentioned above, when 
commodity producers face massive positive demand shocks, other domestic industries may 
benefit from increased derived demand for services or other industrialized products. In some 
cases, governments may actively stimulate the development of new industries with rents 
derived from natural resources (e.g., path 4 in Figure 1). For instance, the Chilean government 
has taxed copper producers to support programs to stimulate technological entrepreneurship 
(Lazzarini, 2015).
However, the outcomes of resource accumulation can also influence the design of 
policies via the political action of industry associations, politically connected networks, or 
stakeholders more generally (Haber & Menaldo, 2011). Being regulated and subject to 
changes in government policy, natural resource sectors are often the targets of politicians 
trying to secure compensation for favors and changes in regulation implemented to benefit 
certain firms and constituencies. At the same time, firms may develop strategies to adapt and 
even influence policy (Shaffer, 1995). For instance, many countries concentrate the 
production and extraction of natural resources in ‘national champions’ supported and even 
owned by the state. Pressure from incumbent producers of commodities may also induce 
governments to support natural resource industries more than other industries; in other words, 
political action can also fuel the cycle of reinforced resource specialization (paths 1 and 2 in 
Figure 1). 
Thus, the reverse causal effect, where the outcomes of resource accumulation affect 
industrial policies, is essentially influenced by cooperative and stakeholder-based 
arrangements that try to preserve and appropriate rents. This point is particularly relevant in 
the case of commodities subject to frequent (and unpredictable) market shocks, which 
generate rents that need to be redistributed among players. For instance, Ramírez and Tarziján 
(forthcoming) show that an increase in the price of minerals increases the extent of value 






























































appropriation by employees, and that this effect is moderated by government policies and 
regulations. They find that value capture by employees (in the form of higher wages) 
increases in the case of employees of state-owned enterprises, which tend to be prevalent in 
natural resource sectors. This finding suggests that government involvement with national 
champions not only affects firm-level performance but also influences the behavior and 
outcomes of diverse stakeholders trying to appropriate gains from valuable resources (Coff, 
1999). 
As this example suggests, the interplay between stakeholders and industrial policies 
may be particularly relevant and direct in the case of state-owned enterprises. They may also 
encompass a hybrid combination of state and private owners with diverging interests, which 
should induce not only critical principal-agent conflicts, but also principal-principal 
conflicts—i.e., misalignment between multiple shareholders (Dharwadkar, George, & 
Brandes, 2000). For instance, state owners may mandate higher royalties from the extraction 
of oil and mining resources, which may reduce profits and hence reduce the ability of private 
owners to extract value from their equity investments (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014).15 
Implications and Suggestions for Future Research
We now build on the six observations above to discuss research implications for the 
study of firm strategy in natural resource industries. Table 1 summarizes our research 
suggestions, linking each proposal to the observations described above. In our view, there is 
considerable room for substantial and novel investigations into the determinants of 
competitive advantage, non-market value capture mechanisms, and public policy outcomes 
based on dynamics occurring in commodity markets. More specifically, drawing on the 
15 Industrial policies can also be shaped by way of influence and pressure activities exerted by organized 
networks such as civic, government support institutions, and transnational-wide interest groups (e.g., farmer 
interest groups with an EU-wide membership—so called Euro groups), which, for instance, enjoy an exclusive 
position in the formation of agricultural policy within the EU political process (van der Zee, 1997).






























































distinctive features of natural resource industries outlined above, we suggest potential 
research opportunities to generate new insights or refine basic theoretical tenets in strategic 
management. 
*** Insert Table 1 about here ***
Beyond the Product Lifecycle
In our observation #1, we argued that natural resource industries involve products that 
are more or less stable in their physical attributes, rendering the application of traditional 
product lifecycle theories less pertinent than in differentiated product industries. This 
observation calls for more research on how firms’ product strategy evolves beyond the usual 
dynamics of new product introduction or the replacement of obsolete designs. Future research 
can examine alternative forms of differentiation involving progressive changes in non-
physical attributes or increased product variety within the bounds of standardized patterns. 
These changes may also involve innovations in production processes (observation #2). For 
instance, agribusiness chains have adopted traceability mechanisms to identify the origin of (a 
priori homogenous) products and certification procedures to verify attributes or process 
requirements (e.g., sustainable agricultural production). This research agenda can draw from 
early studies on measurement-based theories of the firm (e.g., Barzel, 1982; Delmas et al., 
2007; Poppo & Zenger, 2002) and potentially generate new theoretical propositions on the 
creation and evolution of capabilities to measure, shape, and enforce commodities’ attributes.
In addition, since commodities’ product lifecycle is largely static, the main concept 
and competitive mechanisms behind the industry lifecycle, as it applies to natural resources, 
should be revisited on at least two grounds. Firstly, the presence of intangible assets in 
manufacturing and technological industries (e.g., brand or product R&D) usually explains the 
formation of cohorts of large firms with higher survival rates and, eventually, the advent of 
successful niche competitors. Yet, when intangible assets are absent, size advantages play a 






























































reduced role, allowing mid-size competitors to enjoy higher survival rates (Cruz Novoa, 
Reyes, & Vassolo, 2016). Secondly, the need for cost competition in the context of 
undifferentiated products might limit the viability of niche strategies. All in all, natural 
resources offer an opportunity to revise strategy theories explaining industry evolution, firm-
level rents, and survival rates. 
Closely tied to this argument is the quest for the optimal level of within-industry 
diversification, which we define as the process of increasing product variety in the same industry 
through the creation of submarkets (Zahavi & Lavie, 2013). Resource partitioning scholars focus 
on the existence or creation of different submarkets within an industry to explain survival. 
According to this view, organizations evolve to become specialists or generalists (Freeman & 
Hannan, 1983; Singh & Lumsden, 1990). Specialists offer a narrow set of products, seeking to 
take advantage of efficiency gains and targeting particular customer types (Barroso & Giarratana, 
2013). Generalists, in contrast, draw on a broad range of resources and serve a broad range of 
customers. These underlying theories anticipate a U-shaped relationship between within-industry 
diversification levels and firm survival and performance. However, in the absence of an 
underlying product lifecycle, and with lower possibilities of building competitive advantage 
through intangible assets, the mechanisms explaining these relationships should also be 
revisited. One suggestion would be to revisit the direct relationships between scale economies 
at the product level and scope economies at the firm level on the one hand, and performance 
and survival on the other. We are particularly calling for longitudinal empirical studies in this 
area.
Natural resource industries are providers of basic inputs to industries that are subject 
to the product lifecycle. Therefore, although it is inappropriate to directly apply product 
lifecycle theory to commodities, commodity industries are not totally independent of the 
competitive dynamics of industries subject to the lifecycle. For example, the increase in the 






























































demand for lithium resulting from the emergence of the electric car industry has bolstered 
lithium prices. Eventually, when this industry reaches maturity, or finds a substitute for 
lithium, lithium prices will fall. However, this does not necessarily imply that competitive 
evolution in natural resource industries will mimic that of industries based on non-commodity 
products, particularly because the versatility of natural resources eventually allows them to be 
applied to alternative, non-related uses. Examining such interactions between the product 
lifecycle and demand-side factors may be a promising agenda for future research.
Recurring Entry Timing Advantages
The industry dynamics literature explores the potential competitive advantages 
enjoyed by firms when the timing of entry precedes or follows that of competitors 
(Echambadi, Bayus, & Agarwal 2008; Zachary et al., 2015). In industries subject to waves of 
radical product innovation, pioneers (very early entrants) risk losing competitive advantage 
due to product underdevelopment or a lack of consumer demand for the new product (Min, 
Kalwani, & Robinson 2006). Moreover, while industry standards are still in flux, pioneers 
might become trapped in a product design that customers do not want (Min et al., 2006). 
Also, as discussed in our observation #2, technology disruptions are scarce and mainly 
related to production processes. Despite these characteristics, which would seem to diminish 
entry timing advantages, entry and exit timing decisions are fundamental for differential 
performance in natural resource industries. These decisions are particularly important due to 
the potentially negative correlations between the prices of alternative products that can be 
produced using a scarce natural resource. For example, the owner of a vineyard must decide 
whether to produce grapes for red or white wine. She has full knowledge of current prices but 
cannot anticipate future prices, since they depend on the entry decisions of other competitors. 
The decision to switch markets has an implicit time lag—and therefore an opportunity cost—






























































until the new product reaches full production (e.g., grapevines must grow for several years 
before grapes can be harvested). 
This opens an important avenue of research related to theories of entry timing 
advantages. This research agenda includes opportunities to apply game theory reasoning. For 
example, if a minority of firms enters one market while most competitors remain in the other 
market, the minority group may have the opportunity to earn higher revenues as prices rise in 
the former, non-crowded market. While the minority game has been widely used in other 
contexts (Challet & Zhang, 1998), natural resource industries appear to be an attractive setting 
for theoretical extension examining boundary conditions influencing entry timing advantages. 
In addition, the high temporal volatility in the prices of the same natural resource 
product (as per our observation #1) reinforces the value of inter-temporal arbitrage, 
transforming it into a fundamental capability for firms competing in natural resource 
industries. Hence, the evolution of prices in natural resource markets makes transaction 
timing different from that observed in other industries. For instance, in the case of 
manufactured, differentiated goods, firms have to deal with specific temporal patterns (e.g., 
launching a new product in a holiday season) and often face a downward price trend due to 
the launch of competing product varieties. In natural resource commodities, in contrast, prices 
critically vary within and across years, and may even escalate over time due to temporal 
scarcity, changing the way producers define the timing of their optimal selling and entry 
strategies. 
Finally, given that (as per our observation #6) national champions tend to be relevant 
in natural resource industries, the presence of state-sponsored firms can also transform entry 
timing advantages. For instance, some firms may receive disproportionate state support; this 
extra capital may help fund their growth strategies in domestic or international markets 
(Falck, Gollier, & Woessmann, 2011; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). Holding all else equal, 






























































lower entry costs (as a function of heavy subsidies and support) will stimulate firms to pursue 
early entry and preemptive strategies to outcompete higher-cost competitors solely with 
private capital. In a context involving multiple national champions, entry timing advantages 
may also depend on the willingness and ability of their sponsoring governments to support 
their expansion and cope with intense ex-post competition.  
Renewed Emphasis on Process-Based Innovation and Capabilities
Although scholars have long discussed the differences between product- and process-
based innovations, a more careful examination of innovation patterns in natural resource 
industries can spark renewed theoretical and empirical interest in the latter (as emphasized in 
our observation #2). We foresee several opportunities for theory elaboration by considering 
processes that occur interdependently in long value chains, as is typical for natural resource 
commodities. For instance, the competitive advantage of an exporting mining firm requires 
not only superior capabilities in mineral extraction, but also domestic processing and 
transportation (e.g., railroads), shipping overseas, and delivery in foreign countries (e.g., 
Khanna, Musacchio, & Pinho, 2010). Even if mining firms do not innovate in terms of 
product attributes, they can progressively promote substantial interdependent innovation in all 
of these sequential stages. Firms may also develop unique, heterogeneous strategies to own 
and manage multiple links in the value chain (e.g., Hsieh, Lazzarini, & Nickerson, 2010). 
Although such vertical integration decisions are also common in other industries, natural 
resource commodities traded in large markets provide an ideal context for studying how 
process innovations emerge and evolve in long, sequential value chains, usually spanning 
several countries.
The analysis of long, complex value chains also raises several research questions 
regarding how the partners of natural resource firms operate and evolve. Connecting with our 
observation #4, which emphasizes the role of cooperation and coopetition in natural resource 






























































industries, future research can also examine how these relationships change in a context 
where radical innovations are rare. The literature on coopetition has examined how the value 
of partners changes with surges of new technologies that disrupt existing business models 
(Afuah, 2000). In natural resources, it is possible that partnerships are relatively more stable, 
with suppliers progressively accumulating capabilities via learning-by-doing processes. 
However, as mentioned above, natural resources may be subject to upstream or downstream 
technological shocks. Producers of agricultural or mining inputs, for instance, may implement 
important innovations that change the productivity of commodity sectors and alter their 
competitive position vis-à-vis their rivals. Market shocks may also be relevant: even if 
baseline technologies do not change, commodity firms may frequently switch suppliers (e.g., 
farmers may change their fertilizer or seed suppliers as a function of their relative prices) or 
alter the supply schedule as a function of cyclical changes in demand (e.g., a grain-processing 
firm may sever ties with smaller cooperatives if there is a substantial drop in client orders).
Furthermore, an emphasis on process-based capabilities can inform a more recent 
trend in strategy research: examining heterogeneous practices in addition to heterogeneous 
resources. Bromiley and Rau (2014), for instance, argue that strategy scholars should pay 
more attention to routines and organizational activities, even if they are well-known and 
potentially imitable. A complex interplay between firm-level resources, industry forces, and 
contextual factors can greatly influence whether firms will be able to understand the value of 
certain practices and implement performance-enhancing processes. For instance, although 
certain agricultural process-based technologies are well known and widely available, the 
adoption of these practices depends on farm-level resource endowments (such as 
infrastructure or human capital), as well as contextual conditions (such as linkages with farm 
input companies offering technology transfer programs). Heterogeneous process improvement 






























































can be a way to generate firm-specific competitive advantage even in highly competitive 
markets. 
Capability to Deal with Multiple Markets anchored on the same Commodity
We argued in our observation #3 that commodities have multiple linked markets, 
including markets for financial derivatives that are usually much more liquid and volatile than 
their physical counterparts. This setting creates a unique opportunity to study firm-level 
capabilities to manage multiple markets anchored on the same product. For instance, the 
strategic reorientation of Vitol and Glencore illustrates the challenges that firms face when 
transitioning from middlemen to vertically integrated operators.16 On the one hand, distinct 
activity systems and processes may force firms to specialize in managing either financial or 
physical markets; on the other hand, firms may be able to leverage their knowledge of 
physical markets to develop and support trading strategies in financial markets, or vice versa.
Potential synergies between physical and financial derivative markets are particularly 
important if we consider volatility as an important dimension of performance in strategic 
management. Derivative markets usually involve future price quotes and mechanisms to 
hedge against undesirable price variation. In fact, there is a broad array of organizational 
forms available to firms to manage volatility. A steel company, for instance, can vertically 
integrate backwards in the mining sector, use future or option contracts traded on commodity 
exchanges, or develop customized contracts with suppliers that define future delivery prices 
(e.g., Almeida, Hankins, & Williams, 2017). These capabilities will also be a manifestation of 
process innovations that firms develop over time (as per observation #2) – in this case, 
innovations related to the ability to deal with multiple markets and contracts. Natural resource 
industries, again, provide an ideal setting to study strategies for managing temporal price 
16 For anecdotal accounts, see “Commodities traders face growing pains”, Financial Times, 26 April 2012.






























































linkages and the complex interplay between multiple markets anchored on the same 
commodity. 
Institutional and Non-Market Forces affecting Value Creation and Appropriation 
Our framework identifies processes that influence rent generation from natural 
resources as well as mechanisms that allow industries, networks, and firms to appropriate 
differential economic value. In our observation #4, we stressed that the homogeneous nature 
of natural resource commodities facilitates intra-industry price and quantity coordination led 
by large firms and powerful industry organizations.17 In economics, most studies focus on 
aggregate, industry-level effects of collusion (Motta, 2003); much less attention has been 
devoted to how firms appropriate heterogeneous benefits from these cooperative 
arrangements. Along these lines, and using natural resource industries as an empirical context, 
a fruitful research agenda would be to examine how cooperative arrangements evolve as a 
function of industry- and network-level interactions, and how these interactions influence the 
ability of firms to appropriate differential value, above and beyond what their coopetitors can 
attain.
The idiosyncratic features of natural resource industries also create several 
opportunities to explore value appropriation in the context of multiple stakeholders, as 
suggested in our observation #5. Exploiting value chains anchored on key, scarce natural 
resources poses key challenges for managing stakeholder relations. We discussed earlier how 
perceptions of excessive value captured by one particular party (e.g., multinational firms 
exploiting natural resources in a foreign country) can trigger backlash and conflict in the 
presence of exogenous supply and demand shocks or under the risk of relevant resource 
17 Which is not the norm in other industries; see Ozer and Lee (2009). As we noted before, even when 
production markets are atomized, large organizations may be responsible for the commercialization of products 
and hence implement commitment mechanisms to enforce prices and quantities (see, for example, Ghemawat & 
Lenk, 1990). 






























































depletion. While Henisz et al. (2014) show how investments in political and social capital 
reduce opportunistic hold-ups by stakeholders, they do not examine how instrumental 
stakeholder engagement varies in the presence of endogenous competition (e.g., depletion) or 
exogenous shocks. 
Further research on the potential rents generated by natural resource industries can 
help advance ongoing theoretical discussions on value creation and appropriation in a more 
complex, multi-stakeholder setting (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Klein, Mahoney, 
McGahan, & Pitelis, forthcoming). A particularly interesting feature of natural resource 
industries discussed above is that they are subject to market and technological shocks that 
hold the potential to influence value creation and redistribution. For instance, although some 
agricultural biotechnology innovations increased farm-level efficiency and productivity, they 
triggered a debate on how to share these gains among suppliers and farms. Sudden variations 
in the price of commodities also create an opportunity to examine how multiple stakeholders 
negotiate and redistribute their gains. 
Strategy and Industrial Development Policy
Scholarly interest in the policy implications of firm-level strategies has increased over 
time (Barney, 2005; Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2009). Natural resource industries 
present unique opportunities to examine the complex interplay between policymaking and 
competitive strategizing. As mentioned in our discussion of observation #6, there is a 
bidirectional association between the design of industrial policies and the evolution of natural 
resource industries. On the one hand, industrial policies can change the path of resource 
accumulation and change, a phenomenon that has been understudied in strategy (Lazzarini, 
2015). Thus, policies can help promote investment in technologies oriented toward country-
level development and/or riskier R&D efforts in which the private sector has no interest. For 
instance, Thurber and Istad (2010) argue that state involvement in the Norwegian oil industry 






























































stimulated the development of novel technologies in deep water exploration. In addition, the 
fact that natural resources have more or less stable and undifferentiated traits (observation #1) 
opens a discussion of whether governments should promote upgrading and diversification of 
potential outputs coming from commodity sectors. A fruitful research agenda involves 
exploring how government policies can change the paths of reinforced specialization (paths 1 
and 2 in Figure 1) or, alternatively, stimulate the development of new resources and 
capabilities derived from natural resources (path 4). 
Moreover, because valuable natural resources are generally not only rare but also 
subject to depletion, it would be worthwhile to study the comparative effects of government-
induced versus voluntary firm-level strategies to regulate excessive exploitation of natural 
resources, as well as transition mechanisms to more renewable sources. As mentioned before, 
firms may also be incentivized to diversify their geographical sourcing of scarce natural 
resources and even develop strategies to deal with multiple, rare products. One particular case 
is that of commodity byproducts of mining activity (i.e., metals that result from the mining of 
other major industrial metals; Talens Peiro, Mendez, & Ayres, 2011). This list includes 
gallium (from bauxite); arsenic, cobalt, molybdenum, rhenium, selenium, and tellurium (from 
copper ore); cadmium, germanium, and indium (from zinc); cobalt (from nickel); and 
rhodium and ruthenium (from platinum and palladium). A particular challenge of these metals 
is that the increase in demand stemming from the rapid development of certain final product 
technologies, particularly because of their availability, can limit the lifetime of such 
technologies (Talens Peiro, Mendez, & Ayres, 2013). Therefore, addressing these challenges 
might require active public policies. 
On the other hand, industries, cooperative networks, and organizational stakeholders 
more generally can critically influence the design of policies. Because natural resource 
commodities such as oil or minerals are often seen as strategic, most governments choose to 






























































manage these resources via national champions in the form of state-owned enterprises or 
private firms with relevant government influence. Yet the very presence of the government in 
these sectors creates the possibility of dysfunctional political interference. Governments may 
try to appropriate economic or political benefits by directly or indirectly controlling these 
organizations; and, in response, national champions—and their various stakeholders—may 
develop myriad strategies to bargain with governments and preserve their rents. Because 
natural resource industries are subject to constant market and technological shocks that can 
drastically alter the value of commodities, examining the market and non-market mechanisms 
that influence the redistribution of gains or losses can be a rewarding research agenda (see, as 
an example, Ramírez & Tarziján, forthcoming). 
Conclusion
Natural resource industries represent a significant proportion of economic activity in 
both emerging and developed markets. Despite this fact, strategic management research on 
natural resource industries remains scarce in, if not totally absent from, the main journals in 
the field. This lack of attention may bank on the implicit assumption that strategic insights 
from other industries are directly transferable to the specific context of commodity industries. 
While the dynamics of natural resource industries may seem similar to those of other, more 
intensively researched sectors, we highlight that the forces behind such dynamics differ in 
several key dimensions from what is observed in manufacturing, services, or technological 
industries.
Our paper highlights several key differences between natural resource industries and 
other sectors. For instance, we have drawn attention to the fact that commodities are 
inherently standardized products that do not necessarily fit oft-quoted product lifecycle 
theories. Such standardization results in two particularly unique traits. One is the fact that 
natural resource industries are largely characterized by process rather than product 






























































innovation; the other is that the normalized features of commodities facilitate their trading in 
financial markets at levels well above those in physical markets. Moreover, the extent of both 
the physical and the financial trading of commodities leads to the oft-used textbook example 
of perfectly competitive commodity markets. No less important, firm-level performance in 
commodity markets is largely affected by non-market institutional arrangements, which, in 
turn, can have non-trivial redistribution consequences. These features, we argue, provide a 
rich opportunity to expand theories examining the role of complex stakeholder interactions 
and developing policies—forces that can critically influence the ability of firms to create and 
appropriate value from natural resources.
Our work highlights these differences and provides potential research avenues to 
address unexplored but consequential theoretical and empirical gaps. In our view, pursuing 
such research will enrich our understanding of idiosyncratic industry- and firm-level 
determinants of heterogeneous firm performance in natural resource industries. In addition, 
studying strategy in natural resource industries has important implications for teaching in the 
management field. Since theoretical models inform the conceptual approaches taught in 
universities, the lack of research on natural resource industries may lead to the use of 
inappropriate or, at best, incomplete analytical frameworks, limiting the utility of strategic 
management classes for students who later pursue careers in natural resource industries. We 
believe that our suggested research agenda may not only improve the understanding of how 
natural resource industries function, but also benefit strategic management as a whole through 
the examination of the structural conditions, institutional factors, and competitive 
mechanisms involved in these industries.
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FIGURE 1: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING STRATEGY IN NATURAL RESOURCE INDUSTRIES
Legend:  = accumulation of specialized natural resources and capabilities;  = feedback loop via demand or supply factors;   = depletion of natural resources;  = 
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TABLE 1. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH DERIVED FROM KEY 
FEATURES OF NATURAL RESOURCE INDUSTRIES
Potential research agenda Link with key features of natural resources
Examining competitive dynamics 
beyond the product lifecycle
Natural resource industries involve products that are more or less 
stable in their physical attributes, thereby rendering the application 
of traditional product lifecycle theories less pertinent than in 
differentiated product industries (observation #1). In this context, 
scholars should pay crucial attention to changes in production 
processes rather than changes in the product per se (observation 
#2).
In-depth analysis of recurring entry 
timing advantages
Because natural resources are usually commodities whose features 
barely evolve over time (observation #1), and technology changes 
are scarce and mainly related to production processes (observation 
#2), these industries provide a unique setting for analyzing 
recurring entry timing advantages. Additionally, entry decisions 
may be affected by non-market factors, such as various types of 
government incentive and support (observation #6).
Renewed emphasis on the study of 
process-based innovation and 
capabilities
In natural resource industries, innovations are mostly based on the 
development of improved processes (observation #2). Furthermore, 
given the importance of cooperation and coopetition in these 
industries (observation #4), distinct patterns of process-based 
innovation may change the mechanisms through which partners can 
create and appropriate value from new, improved processes and 
practices.  
Examination of complex capabilities to 
deal with multiple markets anchored on 
Commodities have multiple linked markets, including markets for 
financial derivatives that are usually much more liquid and volatile 






























































the same products than their physical counterparts (observation #3). Thus, there is an 
opportunity to study firm-level capabilities to manage multiple 
markets anchored on the same product (e.g., the markets for 
physical commodities and commodity derivatives). The evolution 
of these capabilities likely involve constant change in market-
related processes (observation #2). 
Scrutinizing the institutional and non-
market forces affecting value creation 
and appropriation
The homogeneous nature of natural resource commodities 
facilitates intra-industry price and quantity coordination led by large 
firms and powerful industry organizations (observation #4). At the 
same time, these firms and organizations need to deal with potential 
conflict involving the distribution of economic value between 
various stakeholders in natural resource-rich localities (observation 
#5).
Strategy and industrial development 
policy: the origin and development of 
‘national champions’
Industrial policies can have important consequences for the 
accumulation and change of natural resources and capabilities. For 
instance, because products based on natural resources have more or 
less stable and undifferentiated traits (observation #1), 
policymakers often debate whether countries should promote 
upgrading or diversification into other sectors, or instead stimulate 
national champions involved in natural resource industries. In 
another direction, industry players may try to preserve or 
appropriate rents emanating from natural resources via their 
influence on policymaking (observation #6). 
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